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Howrah-Mumbai route - A highly congested mainline with IR |
The 508 km
Mumbai–Ahmadabad bullet train project began with an estimated cost of around ₹1 lakh crore. Today, that figure has already crossed ₹2 lakh crore, and by the time the first train runs, it may go even higher. Does this mean India should avoid investing in bullet trains? Absolutely not. High-speed rail is important and should be welcomed.
In fact, Indian Railways has already begun viability studies for new high-speed corridors across the country. Recent reports suggest proposed routes spanning nearly 4,000 km, with an estimated cost of ₹16 trillion, including corridors such as
Mumbai-Pune, Pune-Hyderabad, Hyderabad-Bengaluru, Hyderabad-Chennai, and Delhi-Varanasi. Ambition is clearly not lacking.
But ambition alone is not enough.
The real question is whether we are giving the same level of attention to existing railway assets.
Railways are modernizing stations and introducing new rolling stock like the
Vande Bharat(VB) trains, including upcoming sleeper versions. Yet, despite their design capability, Vande Bharat trains are not running anywhere near their full potential speeds on most routes. Only a few short sections allow them to operate faster, while across the rest of the network, time savings compared to older trains are sometimes not enough to justify their fares.
This is not a new problem. Even before Vande Bharat, India had trains capable of higher speeds. The
Gatimaan Express, introduced in 2016, was rated for 160 kph, but it could sustain this speed only on the
Delhi-Agra section. The
Tejas Express, launched in 2017 and also rated for 160 kph, usually runs at around 130 kph and that too not across its entire route.
Shatabdi trains, introduced back in 1988, can reach 150 kph only on select stretches. Rajdhani and Duronto services face similar limitations.
These examples point to a clear issue: the constraint is not trains, but infrastructure.
Upgrading existing tracks, signalling systems, fencing, and maintenance standards requires sustained investment and execution. Without this, new trains and new projects will continue to underperform.
The same pattern is visible beyond passenger services. The Dedicated Freight Corridors(DFC) were announced in 2005, yet while the Eastern DFC is operational, the Western DFC is still expected only by 2026 - nearly two decades later. Meanwhile,
Vizhinjam International Seaport has already become functional, but its dedicated rail link is incomplete.
Cochin Port, operational even before Independence and strategically located near international shipping lanes, has weak rail connectivity, with only about 25–27% of cargo moved by rail.
Because inland waterways and coastal shipping remain underdeveloped in India, this shortfall pushes even larger share of long-distance hinterland freight onto already congested roads. Again, the issue is not the absence of new projects, but the underutilisation of existing ones.
There is also a softer, but equally important, aspect-civic sense. Modern trains like Vande Bharat often become unclean by the end of a single journey. Infrastructure investment alone cannot solve this. Civic responsibility must be treated as seriously as technical education, starting at the school level.
India’s railways undoubtedly need new lines, faster trains, and ambitious projects. But progress cannot come only from what is new and visible. Reducing
general and sleeper coaches while increasing
AC coaches may improve revenue figures, but it will not automatically improve mobility or logistics efficiency.
True modernisation lies in balancing new investments with systematic upgrades of what we already have. Without that balance, even the most glamorous projects will fall short of their promise.
Sajeev
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